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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
KATHERINE IRENE DEARDEN, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
ALBERT ERROL DEARDEN, 
Defendant and Respondent 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
Case No. 9952 
Respondent herein is in agreement with. the state-
ment set forth in appellant's brief concerning the nature 
of the case, the disposition thereof in the lower court 
and the statement of facts so far as the statement goes. 
However, there should be added to the statement con-
cerning the nature of the case the fact that the com-
plaint alleges in· general terms cruel treatment by -the 
respondent causing appellant great mental distress and 
anguish so that she can no longer remain married to 
respondent (R 1) ;- and the amended cross-complaint of 
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respondent charges appellant 1n the first count with 
cruel treatment accorded him by appellant and in the 
s~cond count ''with the commission of· numerous acts 
of adultery at. dive-rs· times and places and over a con-
siderable period'' of time, more·' especially between the 
27th day of December, 1962, _and the 13th day of Jan-
uary, 1963 (R 22-23). 
Also, there shquld be added to the statement of the 
disposition of. the base in the lower court, the fact that 
'l 
after the trial the court made and entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclujsions of Law, and specifically found 
that ''there was no sufficient reason and grounds to 
justify the plaintif! from leaving the home of herself 
and the defendant and ·that· she is not entitled to a di-
vorce from defendant upon the grounds stated in her 
complaint or otherwise.'' Finding No. 8 (R 50). 
-.. ~ .... . . ~ 
The court further found, Finding No.9 (R. 50), that 
prior to the sepanation of the parties and after the 
plaintiff commenced working in a cafe in Fillmore, Utah, 
she became attached to and intimate with one Leo Brun-
son, who was then working as a cook in the same cafe; 
that she then became cool towards the defendant and 
their home life then deteriorated to the extent that sev-
eral months prior to their separation she refused to co-
habit with defendant, although living in their then 
household. 
The court then found, Finding No. 10 (R. 50) that 
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1:1hortly after plaintiff moved to Salt Lake City, the said 
Brtm14on likewise moved to Salt Lake City; that at 
l('a14t from the period of Dec. 27, 1962, and continually 
up to January 1-t, 1963, the said Brunson occupied the 
apartment of the plaintiff at such hours of the day and 
nig-ht when he was not working in a cafe or cafes; and 
ht>tlwet'n said periods the minor child of plaintiff and de-
fendant was taken from plaintiff's apartment by both 
plaintiff and Brunson at very early hours in the morn-
ing to the apartments or homes of baby-sitters and left 
there during the times when plaintiff and Brunson were 
working; and the court specifically ~ound, Finding No. 
11 (R. 50), that the charges of crneLtreatment of plain-
tiff toward defendant and the charges of adultery have 
been and are sustained. 
The court further found, Finding No. 15 (R. 51) 
that. the defendant is a fit and proper person to have 
the custody of the minor child of both parties, and that 
plaintiff is not either a fit or proper person, and, the 
court further found that the best interests of said minor 
child (a girl of about two years of age) and the welfare 
of said child requires that its custodv be awarded to the 
defendant, and that in keeping said child with him in 
the home of his parents said child :would be living in a 
wholesome and welcome and affectionate environment 
and atmosphere. 
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·Appropriate conclusions of law were made concern-
ing custody in accordance with the findings and concern-
ing a property settlement between the parties {R. 52-53). 
The interlocutory decree made and entered was 
strictly in accordance ·:with the- findings and conclusions 
(R 54-55-56). 
.ARGllMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO GRANT 
PLAINTIFF A DECREE OF DIVORCE AGAINST DE· 
FENDANT AND IN GRANTING DEFENDANIT A 
DECREE OF DIVORCE AGAINST PLAINTIFF 
A reading of the evidence of the plaintiff when she 
testified to her grounds of divorce will without doubt 
convince this· Court that plaintiff had no substantial 
cause for· co:m:plaint against the defendant; and a read-
ing of th~ entire record will disclose without doubt that 
plaintiff left ~efendant because of her attachment to and 
desire to live with one Leo Brunson, a married man who 
had left his wife and three children to live with her. 
The sole complaint upon which plaintiff relies as to 
her grounds for a divorce from defendant are as follows: 
That her husband told her she might as well get a 
divorce but that he would not pay for it (Tr. 9); that if 
she wanted a divorce to get one because he felt for a 
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long time that the marriage wouldn't work (Tr. 9); that 
lw ditl not ea re where she went or what she did as long 
as t-\he did not take the child (Tr. 10) ; that there had 
IH'l'H rumors that he had a girl friend in Nephi and St. 
<h,org-e (Tr. 10); that he wanted her to see a psychiat-
rist. (Tr. 10) ; and that these things made her feel ter-
rihlt>, whereupon she went over to Delta and her dad 
hl'lpetl hC'r come to Salt Lake~ where she filed the suit 
for divorce (Tr. 10). 
Upon cross-examination Mrs. Dearden stated that 
trouble commenced between them because ''she was sup-
posed to have been seeing Leo Brunson" (Tr. 23'); that 
there were rumors about such conduct but that her bus-
band told her he did not believe the rumors (Tr. 24); 
that she never did find out whether there was any basis 
for the rumors that her husband was seeing some girls, 
and at the time of the trial she did not know whether 
there was any truth in such rumors (Tr. 25). 
RarC'l~?' indeed, has a plaintiff, in a contested divorce 
action, presented a case so devoid of any substantial 
grounds for divorce, and many trial judges would refuse 
a divorce upon the proof submitted even if uncontested. 
As a matter of fact the defendant Dearden has de-
nied practically every one of the few incidents relied 
upon by plaintiff as her grounds for divorce (Tr. 47 to 
96). and the trial court chose to believe those denials. 
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It is elementary that the Supreme Court will not dis-
turb the trial court's findings unless they are clearly 
not sustained by the evidence; and it is also elementary 
that the Supreme Court is in no position to and will not 
evaluate the credibility of witnesses as against the trial 
court's. express findings. 
In the very hite case of Tsoufakis vs. Tsoufaki8, _. 
Utah-, 382 P2d 412, Mr. Justice Wade stated the rule 
that the Supreme Court will not disturb a trial court's 
judgment ·unless it appears to be unjust and inequitable 
to the point that there is an abuse of discretion. More-
over, the universal rule is as stated by Mr. Justice Wade 
in this ease, ''the trial court had the opportunity this 
Court does not have of seeing and hearing both parties 
and is therefore in a better position to determine con-
troverted facts.'' 
It is also elementary and fundamental that a review-
ing court upon appeal must review the facts in the light 
most favorable to the party who prevailed below. (Ortega 
vs. Thomas, - Utah -, 383 P2d 406 ). 
As respondent reads the appellant's brief the plain-
tiff does not seriously urge upon this Court that the 
findings of the trial court, excepting as to the charge of 
adultery, are not supported by the evidence. The appel-
lant has not ·assigned as error the insufficiency of the 
evidence to support the findings. 
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Plaintiff's serious complaint is that the finding 
ag-ain~t her as to adultery is not justified from the evi-
dence in this matter. It is then stated in her brief (page 
8) "the basis for the court's finding of adultery on the 
part of the plaintiff was the testimony of B. F. Romano 
of Paramount Detective Agency of Salt Lake City.'' The 
trial court no doubt based the finding of adultery, not 
only on the evidence of Mr. Romano, but also on the 
evidence of Mr. Smith, a detective who worked with and 
assisted Mr. Romano in their investigative work. It 
was stipulated that :Mr. Smith, if on the stand and testi-
fying would testify to the same facts as testified to by 
Mr. Romano, both as to direct and cross-examination 
(Tr. 135). 
T4e trial court was no doubt impressed with and be-
lieved the testimony of one Kenneth William Brunson. 
Brunson testified that while he was working in the cafe 
where the plaintiff and Leo Brunson worked, and in the 
basement of the cafe, he saw plaintiff and Leo Brunson 
in a most compromising position with their undergar-
ments in a state of disarray; and that half an hour there-
after Leo Brunson stated to him ''if you say one word 
of this, 'I will kill you' or 'you will get it'." (Tr. 143 to 
146). The witness was confused as to the date of this 
episode but it happened prior to the time of the separa-
tion of plaintiff and defendant. 
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The trial court also was no doubt impressed with 
and believed the testimony of one Vance Ray Keel, a 
police officer for the City of Fillmore, and who testified 
substantially as follows: That in the early part of July, 
1962, at about 3 o'clock a. m., he followed Leo Brunson; 
that Brunson went up to the Dearden residence, went to 
the door, then left and went around behind the house; 
that sometime later Brunson entered the home; that the 
door ,was opened to admit him and that Brunson re-
:rp.ained in the home at least twenty minutes during which 
time the officer remained in the vicinity of the home; 
that Brunson had parked his car at a service station in 
1fue vicinity; that after going up to the door Brunson 
went away and came back in about fifteen minutes or 
about 3 :30 a. m., that defendant Dearden was in the 
house the first time Brunson came there .but left shortly 
thereafter; that a few minutes after Dearden left the 
house the lights came on in the house and Brunson then 
entered (Tr. 136 to 143). It should be remembered that 
Dearden was employed as a truck driver and his hours 
of employment made it necessary for him to work nights 
as well as in the daytime. 
After Mrs. Dearden 'was confronted with the testi-
mony o£ Officer Keele, and on rebuttal, she attempted to 
explain why Brunson was there. Her explanation was 
that "she was tending the Leo Brunson's baby, and Leo 
came in and said his wife was up trying to take the baby 
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-that she did not know Mrs. Dearden had the baby and 
not for .Mrs. Dearden to let 1\Irs. Brunson have the baby 
but to take her (the baby) down to his (Brunson's) folks 
the next morning.'' 
It will be observed that (from Mrs; Dearden's story) 
Brunson came to tell Mrs. Dearden about the baby at 
three o'clock a. m., but before coming to the house to 
have this discussion he left his truck at a serv1ce station 
several blocks or at least some distance away. It is dif-
ficult to imagine a more stupid and fishy explanation, 
and it is quite obvious the trial court did not believe· any 
part of it. No doubt the trial court could not imagine 
why Brunson par~ed his car a distance from the Dear-
den home before going to the place ; why did he go to 
the door and then around the back until ,Dearden left the 
house; \Yhy was it necessary for Brunson to be in the 
house after Dearden had left and at about 3:30 o'clock 
n. m., and why did the lights come on in the· house after 
Dearden had left and apparently the door was open for 
him without his knocking. 
Much is made by appellant concerning discrepancies 
in the testimony of the witness Romano (corroborated by 
Smith). It is well at this point to observe no· attempt 
was made to attack the character or reputation of the 
two deterti,es, or their motives, nor has any part or por-
tion of the testimony of these detectives been impeached 
or their credibility assailed. 
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In a matter of this kind and considering the length 
of the report of Mr~ Romano, it is very easy to pick out 
a few of his answers on cross-examination and consider 
them out of context. Even a casual reading of his tes-
timony, .and the thoroughness thereof, will convince the 
re,ader that about every night for at least three weeks 
Leo. ·Brunson stayed in the apartment of Mrs. Dearden 
all-night; and taking into consideration the entire record, 
it -would tax the credulity of any person to believe that 
Brunso!l occupied one room each and every night while 
Mrs. Dearden occupied the other. 
· The record shows that Leo Brunson was a married 
man and left thr~e children of his own when he left Fill-
more to go to Salt· Lake City where Mrs. Dearden had 
then gone (Tr. '78). 'Brunson worked as a cook at the 
cafe ·in Fillmore where Mrs. Dearden . also worked, and 
he followed her to Salt Lake about one month after she 
movedthere (Tr. 78). 
·Respondent is in agreement with the general rule 
that circumstantial evidence of adultery must be of a 
clear and convincing nature, and that one alleging adult-
ery has the burden of-proof~ However, as stated by the 
appellant in her brief ''it is true that evidence relating to 
adultery is nearly always circumstantial because the act 
is ·· generally done in secret and --is not susceptible to 
proof." It is rare, indeed, when an actual act of sexual 
.intercourse is witnessed. 
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The case of Revier vs. Rev·ier, 48 Wash. 2d 213, 292 
P2d 861, is a case somewhat in point. The court in that 
ease, commenting upon circumstantial evidence concern-
ing adultery states: 
The evidence tending to show adultery was 
circumstantial. Where this is the case the evi-
dence must show: ( 1) an adulterous disposition on 
~he part of the defendant and the alleged para-
mour; (2} an opportunity to commit the act; and 
(3) circumstances tending to show guilt · (citing 
Barrinuevo vs. Barrinuevo, 287 P2d. 349). Here 
the evidence consisted, in the main, of testimony 
to the effect that appellant' frequently and alone 
entertained, in her darkened home until the early 
hours of the morning, a man whom she had ca-
ressed and with whom she had imbibed in . public. 
In our view, such evidence satisfies the test for a 
circumstantial civil case of adultery. 
In the case of Barrinuevo vs. Barrinuevo, 47 Wash. 
2d 296, 287 P2d 349, the court states: 
Adultery is seldom susceptible of proof ex-· 
cept by circumstantial evidence. The quantum of 
proof required in civil cases is that it must be 
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.· The 
court must take such evidence, as the nature of 
the case permits, bring to bear upon it the exper-
ience and observations of life, weigh it with pru-
denc~ and care an:d give effect to its just prepond-
erance. • • • • The disposition of this case is gov-
erned by the rule announced in many of our for-
mer decision, that the trial judge, having witnesses 
before him and an opportunity to observe their 
demeanor, display of candor and sincerity upon 
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the.~witness stand is in a better position to deter-
mine the truth of the issues than are we who read 
oniy the written record. 'Ve will not disturb hls 
-findings' unless there· ·is ·no evidence to supptn·t 
them or unless we can say that the evidence pre~ 
ponderates against them. 
In the instant case it cannot be_said there is no evi-
dence to sustain a finding of adultery, nor can it be said 
that the ev!dence pr€ponderates against such a finding. 
In the case of Paulson vs. Paulson, 37 Wash. 2nd 555, 
225 P 2d 206, the court states: 
Appellant urges that she should have been 
granted a divorce. The short answer is that the 
trial court did not have to believe her testimony. 
As we have said in Braun vs. Braun, 31 W.ash 2d, 
468, 197 P2d 442 * * * confronted with a situation 
where there are only two witnesses, one of whom 
asserts and the other denies, a trial judge, if un-
decided whom to believe, may find that the acts 
complained of have not been establishedby a pre-
ponderance of the evidence; or, believing one and 
of necessity disbelieving the other, he may find 
that the things complained of did or did not hap-
pen. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ITS FAILURE rr'O 
-~· GRANT PLAINTIFF THE CUSTODY OF rTHE 
MINOR CHILD OF THE PARTIES 
The trial court, after a careful consideration of the 
e;ntire record, and an evaluation of the plaintiff's con-
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duct awl lack of moral stature, made its findings and 
conclusions in effect that the plaintiff was not a fit and 
proper person to have custody of the minor child of the 
parties, that the defendant was a fit and proper person 
and that the best interests of the child required that the 
child's custody be awarded to defendant. 
Plaintiff asserts in her brief that "the only reason 
for her unfitness would have to be the alleged adultery.'' 
What the plaintiff overlooks or chooses to ignore are 
the circullljStances surrounding the numerous acts of 
adultery, and her conduct both before and after the sep-
aration of the parties. 
This is not a case of a mother having committed one 
act of adultery. It is not a case of an act committed 
long after a separation. It is not a case of showing good 
conduct after the act or acts and a change of different 
and better circumstances of living. It is not a case of 
candor with the court and a showing of repentance and 
desire to live a clean and decent life. It is not a case of 
having committed the act with some single young man 
of her own age and in circumstances that might by some 
stretch of the imagination be considered excusable. This 
is a case of misconduct and lack of any moral standards, 
ns testified to by Officer Keele when she entertained 
Brunson in her home at about 3 :30 o'clock in the morn-
ing immediately after her husband left for work. This 
is a case of adultery committed in the basement of the 
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cafe during working hours, while still living with her 
:husband and ·before the separation. This is a case of 
.Jiving in open adultery with' a married man who had de-
.serted his wife and three children, and over a period of 
at least the three weeks testified to by Romano and 
Smith. Since both Brunson and his family and the Dear-
dens were living in Fillmore long prior to Brunson and 
Mrs. Dearden going to Salt Lake City, the Court can 
conclude that Mrs. Dearden was well aware of the fact 
her associations with, and her. adulterous conduct were 
_with full knowledge that her paramour was a married 
~man who had deserted his family to- be with her. This 
·is a case also . where the plaintiff is also guilty of per-
jury when she denied any acts of adultery or misconduct; 
and when she denied under oath that she had seen Brun-
son for three_ weeks or a month prior to the trial on 
-Ap~il 10th,,.1963 (Tr. 45), .when as a matter of fact she 
was seen rid1ng ~ith Brunso~ in his car on March 31st. 
;_Rom~no testified that he and Mr. Smith were going 
down Main Street in Salt Lake City on March 31st and 
·had tagged Brunson and Mrs. Dearden for a block and 
''she was sitting right next to him (Tr. 116-117).- This is 
corroborated by Mr. Smith, since the parties stipulated 
that .. Mr. Smith would testify substantially as did Mr. 
Romano ( Tr. 13f3). 
Moreover, the record discloses that the child was 
taken from her apartment to the home of baby sitters 
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daily (Tr. 37); that the child was taken from the home 
in the early hours of the morning (Tr. 38) to be taken 
to baby sitters; and that if she (the plaintiff) found 
it necessary to work for the next five or ten years she 
intended to have baby sitters look after the girl for 
that period of time (Tr. 183). 
Counsel for defendant have read and considered 
practically every case to be found at least in the Pacific 
Reporter touching on the question of custody of minor 
children where the mother has been charged with and/ or 
found guilty of adultery, and we can say with certainty 
there is no case to be found wherein the mother has 
been found to be a fit and proper person and awarded 
the custod:y- of minor children under circumstances such 
as encountered in the instant case. 
It may be said at the outset that defendant has no 
quarrel with the legal principles as follows : 
That generally adultery will not necessarily deprive 
spouse of care and custody of children; that in arriv-
ing at a determination as to what is best for the welfare 
and happiness of the child, the court will consider the 
ties of nature and association; that the question of cus-
tody is one addressed to the sound discretion of the 
court; that there is no absolute rule by which it can be 
determined which of two contesting parties is entitled 
to custody; that in determining the question of custody, 
the child's best interests has reference more particularly 
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tci the·· moral welfare :than to mere comforts, benefits~ 
etc., and lastly, that each case must be decided upon its 
own factual'· situation. 
The case most strongly relied on by plaintiff is the 
case ofSmit,h vs. Smith, 9 Utah2d 157, 340 P2d 419. In 
that case it is stated ''merely permitting another man 
to visit her after marriage had, for all intents and pur-
poses,' ended, did not constitute such immorality or in-
di~cieti'on as' would. render wife unfit to have custody 
of her minor children, and that absent any evidence of 
lier unfitness presun;tption that she was a fit and proper 
p'erson should. ·prevail.'' In -that ease the Court evi;-
dently was of the opinion· the evidence did not show 
anything more than that the wife permitted a man 
t.6 visit her after ·the' marriage. So far as the Smith 
case opinion dis~los;es there was no evidence of ·adultery 
(as in the case at bar both before and after the sep-
aration) nor was there any continuous living together 
by the .wife with a married. man not her husband, nor 
were the children "carted"- around and "farme.d. out" 
at all hours of the day and night to various baby sitters. 
We do not beUeve that this Court would possibly hold 
that merely because a child of two or three years of 
age is not present during the numerous acts of adultery 
and unable to realize what is going on, is reason to per-
~it 8: mother so lacking in morals to retain custody of 
t4.e child; ~nd this particulady when there is not one 
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ahred of evidence in the record that the mother intends 
to bring up the child under different and better circum-
stances, but upon the contrary insists that she has done 
nothing wrong. 
The case of Steiger vs. Steiqer, 4 Utah 2d 273, 293 
P2d 418, cited by plaintiff, is not a parallel case in any 
respect. In that case the court remarked: 
Stating the case against plaintiff in the strong-
est possible manner, testimony of witnesses indi-
cated that she (1) drank intoxicating liquors, two 
or three times to the point of mild intoxication, 
(2) was frequently seen with a man other than her 
husband and (3) was not a good housekeeper. All 
of this testimony, however, came from defendant's 
witnesses and was rebutted or explained by plain-
tiff and her witnesses. Reading the record as a 
whole, it appears that plaintiff has been in the past 
careless and indiscreet, but that her love for the 
child has caused her to work to provide for him, 
has caused her to spend her free time with him and 
care for his needs, etc. 
In the above case there does not appear to have 
been any extended course of adultery involved, or such 
a low standard of morals as to permit a young wife to 
live ""ith a married man who had deserted his wife and 
three minor children, and it does not appear that the 
mother was farming out her child to various baby sit-
ters. In the Steiger case this Court announced the prin-
ciple that a divorced mother has no absolute right to 
the custody of minor children, but the policy is to give 
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weight to the view that ''all things beingt equal, prefer-~ 
ence should be given to the mother." And in the Steiger 
case this Court took occasion to remark that there was 
no proof that the mother drank excessively so as to ren. 
der her unable to properly care for the child nor is there 
any. evidence of promisc'uity. 
We ask· this · Cou,rt. to take note of the fact that in 
the instant case the acts of . misconduct have taken place 
both before and after the separation of the parties; and 
):il has been stated· by a Court (Revier vs. Revier, and 
PaulsOn vs. Paulson, heretofore cited in this brief) that 
how a parent conducts himself (or herself) after a sepa-
ration has occurr~d may be more revealing than conduct 
fettered by marltal supervision. 
In the case of Christian vs. Christian, 45 Wash. 2d 
'387, 275 P2d 422, the trial court found that the wife 
had been guilty of adultery and having denied it also· com-
mitted perjury. The trial court found the husband had 
not been guilty of cruel treatment toward-s his wife as 
alleged by her and granted the divorce to the husband 
but awarded custody of the children to the· wife. The 
Supreme. Court of Washington reversed the case as to 
custody, holding "true it is that the court stated 'we 
have frequently held that a mother should not be de-
prived of custody of children of tender years unless it 
j,~ clearly shown that she is such an unfit and improper 
person that, her; custody, of the children will·endanger 
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their welfare'." But the Supreme Court went one step 
further and stated: 
We are constrained to hold that it would en-
danger the future welfare of the children involved 
to permit them to be reared by one who displays 
such a flagrant disregard to morality, the law, a 
solemn oath, and the sanctity of the home. It is 
not proper that such a person guide the spiritual, 
mental, moral and physical development of these 
children. It will endanger their welfare. 
And in the instant case the trial court specifically 
found that the husband's parents, where he and the child 
are living, appear to be cultured, d~cent, law-abiding, 
moral citizens. It is respondent's intention to have his 
parents care for his daughter and thus be able to spend 
considerable time with the daughter since he is living 
with his parents. 
The case of Taylor vs. Taylor 126 P2d 855 (Wash.) 
presents a factual situation very similar to the case at 
bar, and the court stated: "I am convinced that she does 
not possess the stable qualities that the two boys are 
entitled to in a mother." 
While the factual situation is not the same, yet the 
Utah Supreme Court in the case of Knapp vs. Knapp, 
'l3 Utah 268, 273 P. 512, stated: 
We are clearly of the opinion that the moral 
surroundings into which the plaintiff placed the 
child awarded to her custody is a proper subject 
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of inquiry. It is equally clear that the character 
of the persons that Roger Michael Knapp was com-
pell(3d. or permitted to associate with ·during the 
time he was in the custody of the plaintiff should 
be inquired into, insofar as it may affect the moral 
welfare of the child (citing numerous cases). 
See: Wilson vs. Wilson, 13 P2d 376; 
Hamilton vs. Hamilton, 231 P2d 69 at page 72; 
. Dodd vs. Dodd, 229 P2d 761. 
The case of Merkel vs. Merkel, 234 P2d 857, is a 
C.ase where t:he Supre~e Court of vV ashington practi-
cally upset a finding that a wife was not guilty of adul-
tery, but thkt if the evidence did not establish adultery, 
~twas abund'antly clear that the wife conducted herself 
in a grossly. improper manner over a period of time and 
the court remarked: 
Viewing the record in its entirety, it is our 
considered 9pinion that the trial court's finding 
that respond~nt is a fit and proper person to have 
th~ custody of A and B is against the clear prepon-
derance ofthe evidence. Proof that a child's phys-
ical ,needs -~re being met is not enough. They 
must· be brought up· in . a wholesome, moral atmos-
phere, if they are to become good, upright, law-' 
abiding citizens. . Respondent has not been pro-
viding. such an ·atmosphere for A and B and they 
should accordingly be removed from her custody. 
The cases_ can p~ multtplied where courts have given 
custody to a .mother · UJ;lder. some questionable circum-
stances, and also ;Where courts have given custody to 
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the father where the mother has been guilty of gross 
misconduct and/or adultery. But the legal principle 
applies ''each case must stand on its own factual situa-
tion.'' We have been unable to find any case where the 
mother has been awarded custody under a factual situ-
ation similar to the case at bar. 
The very last case decided by this Court involving 
the custody of a minor child is the case of Stocks vs. 
Stocks,-- Utah --, 383 P2d 923, in which this Court 
held in addition to the statement ''primary obj.ective in 
custody cases is to provide for child's best interest and 
welfare'' that ''rule favoring mother in child custody 
cases is only one of many factors to be considered and 
is applicable only if all things are equal. And the Court 
had occasion to remark: 
The trial court was in a much better position 
to understand and evaluate the testimony than we 
are~ The court has observed the attitudes, man-
ners and personalities of the parties and has had 
opportunity to evaluate the ability of the parties 
and the effect that association with these parties 
will have on the child's life. * * * * The trial court 
did not find that all things were equal but that it 
was in Billy's best interest to remain with his 
father. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent concludes by stating that the findings 
and conclusions are more than amply supported by the 
evidence and that the interlocutory decree, therefore, 
should be affirmed- in its entirety. 
Respe'ctfully s.ubmitted, 
CLINE AND CLINE, 
Attorneys for Defendant 
and Respondent 
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